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Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has never defined clearly the required ele-
ments of a constitutional capital sentencing scheme. In Pulley v.
Haris,I the Court held that the eighth amendment 2 does not require
a state appellate court to conduct a proportionality review of every
death sentence to determine if the sentence is equivalent to
sentences imposed in similar cases, unless the state capital sentenc-
ing scheme lacks other adequate checks on arbitrary sentencing.3
The Court found that although the California capital sentencing
procedures do not include proportionality review, they are constitu-
tional because they require California juries to find that at least one
statutory aggravating circumstance has been proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. Trial judges also must specify reasons for affirming
the sentence and the state supreme court must review each
sentence.
4
In arriving at its decision in Pulley v. Harris, the Court reviewed
prior death penalty decisions and concluded that the constitutional
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment does not require
proportionality review.5 Yet Pulley v. Harris departs from prior cases
that approved the constitutionality of several state capital sentenc-
ing procedures. In those cases, the Court lauded proportionality
review as an effective safeguard against the arbitrary imposition of
the death penalty by aberrant juries.6 In Pulley v. Harris, however,
1 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984).
2 The eighth amendment states in relevant part that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
3 104 S. Ct. at 880.
4 Id. at 881.
5 See id. at 879-80.
6 See, e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 207 (1976). See also infra notes 46-64 and accompanying text for a discussion
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the Court has approved a state scheme that contains no proportion-
ality review provision.
7
This Note argues that the Court could have reached a different
result based on a number of considerations. First, the precedent
upon which the Court relied did not compel the Court to reject pro-
portionality review as a constitutional requirement, but rather sug-
gests that proportionality review is an important safeguard against
arbitrary sentencing. Second, empirical evidence shows that dispro-
portionate sentencing occurs in the absence of proportionality re-
view. Third, most states with provisions for capital punishment
require a state appellate court to conduct proportionality review.
Last, recent Court decisions on proportionate sentencing provide a
basis for a constitutional requirement of proportionality review of
death sentences. This Note then suggests that despite these consid-
erations, policy reasons validate the Court's holding in Pulley v.
Harris.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 5, 1978, Robert Alton Harris and his brother kid-
napped two teenage boys in order to use the boys' car in a bank
robbery.8 When the two boys moved away from the car, Harris shot
and killed them and then used the vehicle to rob a bank.9
A California jury convicted Harris of kidnapping, robbery, and
the first degree murder of the two boys.)0 After finding that the
state had proved statutory "special circumstances" beyond a reason-
able doubt,II the jury, in a separate hearing, sentenced Harris to
death for the murders.' 2 On his automatic appeal,' 3 the California
of the Court's treatment of the proportionality review procedures of Georgia and
Florida.
7 Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984).
8 People v. Harris, 28 Cal. 3d 935, 944, 623 P.2d 240, 244, 171 Cal. Rptr. 679, 683
(1981).
9 Harris, 104 S. Ct. at 873 n.l.
10 Id.
11 Id. Because the trial court convicted Harris of more than one count of murder, see
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)(5) (West 1977), and of committing a murder willfully and
deliberately during the commission of a robbery and kidnapping, see id. at
§ 190.2(c)(3)(i), (ii), the jury found that the prosecution proved statutory aggravating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Harris, 104 S. Ct. at 873 n.1.
12 Harris, 104 S. Ct. at 873 n.1. The California statute, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3
(West 1977), required the jury to consider several additional factors in the separate sen-
tencing. During the hearing, the prosecution presented evidence that Harris had
sodomized other inmates while in jail, had threatened other inmates' lives, and had been
found in possession of a jail-made knife and a wire garrote. The defense presented
evidence for jury consideration that established that Harris' father had been an alcoholic
who had served two prison terms for having sexual intercourse with Harris' sisters and
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Supreme Court affirmed Harris' conviction and sentence, and dis-
missed his claims of unfair pretrial publicity, evidentiary errors, and
the unconstitutionality of the death penalty statute. 14 The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari.1 5
Harris then pursued a writ of habeas corpus to three levels of
the California state courts, claiming that the appellate court had
failed to provide him with a constitutionally required proportional-
ity review of his sentence. 16 Courts at all three levels denied the
writ.' 7 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari again.' 8
Harris next sought habeas relief from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of California claiming, inter alia, that
the Constitution required the California appellate court to conduct
a proportionality review of his sentence.19 The district court denied
his claim without written opinion, 20 but issued a certificate of prob-
able cause.
2 '
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and held that ear-
lier Supreme Court decisions established that the Constitution re-
quired a state appellate court to conduct a proportionality review of
a death sentence. 22 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to con-
sider whether the Constitution requires states to conduct propor-
tionality reviews of death sentences.
23
that Harris' mother kicked him out of the house at the age of fourteen. Harris, 104 S. Ct.
at 873 n.1.
13 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4 (West 1977).
14 People v. Harris, 28 Cal. 3d 935, 623 P.2d 240, 171 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1981) (re-
jecting defendant's constitutional claim by citation to People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264,
618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1983); People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 599 P.2d
587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979)).
15 Harris v. California, 454 U.S. 882 (1981) (denial of certiorari).
16 Harris, 104 S. Ct. at 874.
17 Id.
18 Harris v. California, 457 U.S. 1111 (1982) (denial of certiorari).
19 Harris sought federal habeas corpus relief through 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976), which
provides that a federal court may "entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws and treaties of the
United States."
20 The district court judge issued a statement in which he said that the Supreme
Court has not mandated a proportionality review; thus, the district court judge held that
the California statute was constitutional. Joint Appendix at 14-15, Pulley v. Harris, 104
S. Ct. 871 (1984).
21 Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1976) (prisoner must obtain certificate of probable cause before
he can appeal district court's denial of habeas corpus to federal court of appeals).
22 Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984).
23 Pulley v. Harris, 103 S. Ct. 1425 (1983) (grant of certiorari).
8411984]
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III. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
In a seven-to-two decision, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
and held that the eighth amendment did not require a state appel-
late court to conduct proportionality reviews of death sentences.
24
Writing for the majority, Justice White concluded that prior deci-
sions of the Court did not establish proportionality review as a con-
stitutional requirement, and that such review was not necessary to
control arbitrary death sentencing under the California scheme.25
The Court first held that Harris was not entitled to a propor-
tionality review under California state law.26 The Court determined
that the California Supreme Court had stated clearly that a prisoner
sentenced to death did not have a right to a review of the propor-
tionality of his sentence.
27
The Court next considered the eighth amendment issue and re-
affirmed its own prior holding that the eighth amendment's ban on
cruel and unusual punishment requires that courts not impose death
sentences arbitrarily. 28 In Pulley v. Harris, the Court reviewed prior
cases in which it had upheld capital sentencing schemes and con-
cluded that the proportionality review element of state schemes that
contained such review29 was merely an additional safeguard against
arbitrariness. 30 The Court held that procedures other than propor-
tionality review were more essential in preventing arbitrary and in-
discriminate sentencing.3 1
The Court broadly construed its decision inJurek v. Texas32 and
24 Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 881 (1984), revk 692 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1982).
25 Id. at 879-80.
26 Id. at 874-75. The Court held that it could not grant Harris' federal habeas corpus
petition on a perceived error of state law. Id. Additionally, the Court held that there
was no error in state law because the California courts had rejected Harris' demand for
proportionality review without departing from precedent. Id.
27 Id. (question of whether state law has evolved to afford petitioner a proportionality
review is matter for state court to decide).
28 Id. at 876 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
29 See, e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976).
30 See 104 S. Ct. at 876-80.
31 Id. at 876-79. The Court mentioned alternative procedures in the Georgia scheme
that limited jury discretion, including bifurcated trials for conviction and sentencing, a
limited number of crimes that are punishable by death, the requirement that at least one
aggravating circumstance be present, and jury consideration of mitigating factors. Id. at
876-77 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-99).
The Court noted the existence of similar provisions in the Florida scheme, includ-
ing bifurcated proceedings, the requirement of a statutory aggravating circumstance,
and the vesting of ultimate sentencing authority in the judge rather than thejury. Id. at
878-79 (citing Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 247-53).
32 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
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held that that decision conclusively showed that proportionality re-
view is not a requirement of a constitutional capital sentencing
scheme. 33 Although the Texas scheme calls for prompt judicial re-
view of death sentences, it does not require proportionality
review.3 4
The Court then examined the elements of the California capital
sentencing scheme and concluded that because of its limitation of
jury discretion and requirement of review of the jury's decision by
the trial judge and an appellate court, the scheme contained suffi-
cient constitutional checks on arbitrariness.3 5 The existence of
these elements satisfied the Court's eighth amendment concerns.
3 6
The Court concluded by recognizing that no sentencing scheme
could be perfect, but distinguished any defects in the present system
as trivial compared to the defects that caused the Court to invalidate
the death sentencing schemes considered in Furman v. Georgia.3 7
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, expressing his view
that capital sentencing schemes must contain some form of mean-
ingful appellate review to meet constitutional requirements.3" Jus-
tice Stevens noted that all statutory capital sentencing schemes
approved by the Court, including the California scheme, have guar-
anteed some form of meaningful appellate review.39 Justice Stevens
did not specify the elements of meaningful appellate review, but
stated that it did not necessarily include proportionality review.
40
In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, argued
that the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment
requires a state appellate court to conduct reviews of all death
sentences to determine if they are proportionate to sentences in
similar cases.4 1 According to Justice Brennan, actual experience in
33 Harris, 104 S. Ct. at 879.
34 Id. at 878.
35 Id. at 880-81. Specifically, the California sentencing scheme of 1977, under which
the Court sentenced Harris to death, provided that a person could be sentenced to
death only if the jury found that one or more "special circumstances" existed. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1977). When the state proves a special circumstance beyond
a reasonable doubt, the defendant receives a separate hearing in which counsel presents
mitigating and aggravating factors to the jury. Id. at § 190.3. Thejury determination of
either death or life imprisonment without parole is subject to review not only by the trial
judge, but also by appellate courts. Id. at §§ 190.4(e), 1239(b).
36 104 S. Ct. at 881. The Court, however, did leave open the possibility that it would
require proportionality review under a different scheme if the scheme lacked adequate
checks on arbitrariness. Id. at 880.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 881-84 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
39 Id. at 884 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 885 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the administration of the death penalty demonstrates that states
have not eliminated arbitrariness in sentencing.42 Justice Brennan
reasoned that proportionality review is necessary to remove some, if
only a small part, of the irrationality of capital sentencing.43
Discounting fears that proportionality review would be burden-
some, Justice Brennan emphasized the ease with which state courts
could conduct such reviews. 44 Taking issue with the majority's fail-
ure to address the merits of proportionality review, Justice Brennan
argued that state courts already have effectively used such proce-
dures to eliminate inconsistencies in sentencing.
45
IV. PRIOR SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Rather than establishing that a capital sentencing scheme is
constitutional without proportionality review, earlier Court deci-
sions suggest that proportionality review checks sentencing aberra-
tions that could make a death sentence unconstitutionally cruel and
unusual. Four years after ruling in Furman v. Georgia46 that capital
punishment as it was then administered was cruel and unusual,47 the
Supreme Court upheld revitalized capital sentencing schemes in
42 Id. at 886-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that no one has yet
compiled complete evidence of discriminatory and irrational imposition of the death
penalty. He did, however, cite studies suggesting that the race of both the defendant
and the victim affect the probability of the sentencing authority imposing a death sen-
tence. Id. at 887-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Crimi-
nal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death
Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REV. 783 (1981); Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death
Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95 HARV. L. REV. 456 (1981)).
43 Id. at 888 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan recognized that proportional-
ity review could not measure and correct certain forms of irrational sentencing, such as
sentences based on race, gender, socio-economic status, or geographic location within a
state. Id.
44 Id. at 890 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that over thirty states
require, either by statute or judicial decision, some form of proportionality review. Id.
45 Id. at 890-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
47 Id. at 239. Furman involved Georgia and Texas death penalty procedures. The
Court issued a per curiam opinion in which it held that both statutes were unconstitu-
tional. Id. EachJustice voting to invalidate the death sentence wrote a separate opinion,
as did each dissenting Justice. Justices Brennan and Marshall viewed the death penalty
as cruel and unusual punishment in all instances. Id. at 257 (Brennan,J., concurring); id.
at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White each expressed
the view that the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment because the
states imposed the sentence in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Id. at 240 (Douglas,
J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring). The
Court, in later death penalty decisions, has regarded the opinions of the latter three
Justices as forming the holding of Furman that the penalty of death is unconstitutional if
states do not impose it rationally. See Harris, 104 S. Ct. at 876; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188.
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Gregg v. Georgia,48 Proffitt v. Florida,49 and Jurek v. Texas5° because the
schemes satisfied the concerns about arbitrary sentencing that the
Court had expressed in Furman.51 In all of these decisions, the
Court mentioned several aspects of the new state capital sentencing
schemes that limit arbitrariness. 52 The Court did not require in any
of these cases that all capital sentencing schemes have proportional-
ity review, but it also did not address directly the issue of whether
this review is constitutionally required. These cases, therefore, do
not compel the view that a state appellate court may affirm a death
sentence without reviewing it to ensure that it is proportionate to
sentences imposed for similar crimes.
The opinions in Gregg v. Georgia53 demonstrate the importance
of proportionality review. In Gregg, the Court examined the proce-
dures of Georgia's revised capital sentencing statute to determine
whether they reduce arbitrariness and capriciousness. 54 The post-
Furman Georgia sentencing scheme includes a proportionality re-
view, and Gregg supports the contention that proportionality review
is necessary to a constitutional death sentencing scheme. Justices
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, writing jointly, concluded that Geor-
gia's proportionality review "substantially eliminates the possibility
that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant
jury."55 In a concurring opinion, Justice White, joined by ChiefJus-
tice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, noted that the provision for ap-
pellate review was an "important aspect of the new Georgia
48 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
49 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion).
50 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion).
51 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259-60;Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276.
52 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-98; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 247-51;Jurek, 428 U.S. at 268-70
(limiting class of murders for which juries may impose death sentences, requiring that
jury find statutory aggravating circumstance before imposing death, and automatic ap-
peal of death sentences to higher court all limit arbitrariness).
53 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
54 Id. at 198.
55 Id. at 206 (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., concurring). The new Georgia
scheme requires that in reviewing death sentences, the Georgia Supreme Court must
determine:
(1) whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and
(2) whether, in cases other than treason or aircraft hijacking, the evidence sup-
ports the jury's orjudge's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance ... and
(3) whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the pen-
alty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and defendant.
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(c) (Supp. 1975). The statute also requires the Georgia
Supreme Court to include a list of similar cases and their holdings in its decision. Id. at
§ 27-2537(e). Additionally, the court must appoint a special assistant to maintain
records of all death penalty cases. Id. at § 27-2537(f)-(h).
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legislative scheme." 56 Although the Court discussed other elements
of the Georgia scheme that limited arbitrariness, it did not distin-
guish which of the elements was most essential to the scheme's
constitutionality.
57
Building on Gregg in Zant v. Stephens,58 the Supreme Court noted
that the state court review of death sentences, which included pro-
portionality review, was one of the features that led the Court to
approve Georgia's scheme in Gregg.59 The Court in Zant also stated
that the proportionality review procedure provides a safeguard
against arbitrary sentencing when a court sentences a defendant to
death based upon a jury finding of a statutory aggravating circum-
stance that the state supreme court later holds unconstitutionally
vague. 6
0
The Supreme Court's opinion in Proffitt v. Florida 61 further indi-
cates the importance of proportionality review. In Florida, the state
supreme court conducts proportionality review pursuant to judicial
decision rather than by statute.62 The United States Supreme Court
in Proffitt noted that Florida's review procedures "can assure consis-
tency, fairness and rationality in the evenhanded operation of the
state law." 63 In fact, the Proffitt opinion stated that because Florida
had in effect adopted the Georgia procedure of proportionality re-




The Court in Pulley v. Harris concluded that prior Court deci-
56 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 211 (WhiteJ., concurring).
57 Id. at 196-98 (holding that ten statutory aggravating circumstances, consideration
by jury of appropriate aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and automatic appeal
to Georgia Supreme Court all serve to limit arbitrariness in capital punishment cases).
58 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983).
59 Id. at 2742.
60 Id. at 2738 (citing Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 224 S.E.2d 386 (1976), for propo-
sition that statutory aggravating circumstance allowing for capital punishment of de-
fendants with substantial histories of serious assaultive criminal convictions is
unconstitutionally vague).
61 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion).
62 The Florida statute on capital sentencing requires the Florida Supreme Court to
automatically review each death sentence, but contains no specific provision for propor-
tionality review. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4) (West Supp. 1984). Nevertheless, in
State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973), the Florida Supreme Court undertook to
conduct reviews of death sentences for proportionality to guarantee that "the reasons
present in one case will reach a similar result to that reached under similar circum-
stances in another case." Id.
63 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 260.
64 Id. at 258-59.
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sions compel the holding that the Constitution does not require
proportionality review and that such review is unnecessary to reduce
arbitrary sentencing in the California scheme. The Court, however,
could have arrived at a different result based upon an analysis of its
prior case law, empirical evidence, state practice, and principles of
proportionate sentencing. First, in prior death penalty decisions
that mention proportionality review, the Court lauded the proce-
dure for minimizing arbitrariness. Second, empirical evidence sug-
gests that disproportionate sentencing can occur under a state
scheme that does not include proportionality review procedures.
Third, most states that allow capital punishment include propor-
tionality review procedures as part of their sentencing schemes. Fi-
nally, the Court in Solem v. Helm65 announced principles upon which
it could model a review procedure for death sentences to determine
whether they are proportionate to penalties in similar cases. Never-
theless, policy considerations against requiring proportionality re-
view of each death sentence validate the Court's holding.
Although the Gregg, Zant, and Proffitt decisions all emphasized
the importance of proportionality review in capital sentencing
schemes, the Court in Pulley v. Harris chose to narrowly interpret
these three decisions. The Pulley v. Harris majority's reliance on
Gregg misapplied that precedent in two respects. First, the Court
mistakenly found that proportionality review was not a critical factor
in the decision to uphold the constitutionality of the Georgia death
penalty scheme in Gregg.66 Pulley v. Harris focused on a section of
the Gregg opinion in which the Court referred to appellate review as
"an additional safeguard against arbitrary and capricious sentenc-
ing." 67 The Court's analysis is unconvincing, however, because the
Gregg opinion listed the elements of the Georgia scheme in the order
they occur in the trial process, starting with jury criteria and ending
with appellate review. The Court used words such as "additional"
more as temporal transitions than as indications of the relative im-
portance of various elements of the system.6 8 Second, the Court in
Pulley v. Harris ignored the part of the Gregg opinion in which the
Court analyzed the petitioner's claim that the lower court did not
properly conduct his proportionality review; in this section of Gregg,
the Court held that Georgia's method of conducting proportionality
review was not unconstitutional. 69 If the proportionality review pro-
65 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
66 See Harris, 104 S. Ct. at 877.
67 Id. at 877 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198, 204-06, 222-23).
68 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-98.
69 Id. at 204 n.56. The petitioner in Gregg claimed that the types of cases the Georgia
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cedure is merely supplementary to the scheme's constitutionality, as
the majority in Pulley v. Harris maintained, the Court in Gregg could
have dismissed the petitioner's claim without analyzing whether the
methods of implementation were proper.
70
The Court distinguished both Gregg and Zant from Pulley v. Har-
ris by asserting that those cases did not expressly require that a con-
stitutional capital punishment statute contain provisions for
proportionality review at the appellate level. 7 1 Neither Gregg nor
Zant expressly stated that the Constitution requires another state
scheme to duplicate any specific procedure of the Georgia system. 72
Yet the language of these opinions suggests that proportionality re-
view is a sufficiently important part of a capital sentencing scheme to
merit consideration as a constitutional requirement.
The Court in Pulley v. Harris similarly distinguished Proffitt v.
Florida. It dismissed the importance of Florida's proportionality re-
view procedure, as it had that of Georgia, by reiterating the other
elements of the sentencing scheme that also channeled jury discre-
tion and limited arbitrariness. 73 The Court noted that the concur-
ring opinion in Proffitt had not even mentioned Florida's appellate
review procedures. 74 Justice White, writing the concurring opinion
in Profitt, had stated, however, that he would not repeat the statu-
tory procedures of Florida's capital sentencing scheme in that opin-
ion.75 Because the joint opinions in Gregg and Proffitt by Justices
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, and Justice White's concurring opin-
ion in Gregg lauded proportionality review, it is doubtful that a deci-
sion requiring such review in all cases would "substantially depart
from the sense" of those opinions, as the Court claimed in Pulley v.
Supreme Court had considered resulted in an ineffective basis for measuring the pro-
portionality of a death sentence. Id. Specifically, the petitioner alleged that effective
review required the court to consider nonappealed capital convictions where courts im-
posed only a life sentence and homicides that did not result in capital convictions. Id.
Additionally, the petitioner alleged that the inclusion of pre-Furman death sentences was
an inadequate basis for review. Id.
70 In Gregg, the Court stated that the Georgia Supreme Court had the authority to
consider homicide cases where courts had not imposed the death penalty. Id. at 204
n.56. The Court also found that the Georgia courts had to examine pre-Furman cases
because of the paucity of post-Furman cases at the beginning of the new procedure. Id.
71 Harris, 104 S. Ct. at 879.
72 See Zant, 103 S. Ct. at 2741; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.
73 Harris, 104 S. Ct. at 877-78. The Court mentioned the bifurcated guilt and sen-
tencing procedure, the requirement that the sentencing authority find a statutory aggra-
vating circumstance that is not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances, the focus
on individualized sentencing, and the vesting of ultimate sentencing authority in the
judge rather than the jury. Id. at 877.
74 Id. at 877-78.




Rather than broadly interpret the Gregg, Zant, and Proffitt deci-
sions, the Court instead chose to interpret broadly its decision in
Jurek v. Texas,77 in which it upheld the Texas capital sentencing
scheme. Because the Texas scheme does not mandate a proportion-
ality review, the Court in Pulley v. Harris ruled that prior case law
does not require proportionality review as part of a constitutional
capital sentencing scheme. The Court inJurek, however, did not di-
rectly address the contention that the Texas scheme was invalid for
failure to include proportionality review. Additionally, because the
Court in Jurek emphasized that the Texas scheme would ensure
evenhanded sentencing, it may have presumed that the Texas ap-
peals court would conduct proportionality review.
78
Analysis of Gregg, Zant, and Proffitt shows that the Court could
have decided Pulley v. Harris differently without "effectively over-
rul[ing]Jurek.' '79 The Texas capital sentencing scheme inJurek con-
tains narrower grounds for imposing the death penalty than do the
schemes of Georgia, Florida, and California. The Court's review of
the California scheme in the second part of Pulley v. Harris demon-
strates that the California scheme bears greater similarity to the
schemes of Georgia and Florida than to that of Texas. California,
like Georgia and Florida, allows a sentencing authority to impose a
death sentence based on the existence of statutory aggravating fac-
tors that it must balance against mitigating factors. The Texas stat-
utory scheme differs from those of Georgia, Florida, and California
in that it limits the application of the death penalty to homicides
occurring in five specific situations.8 0 Furthermore, before it may
impose a death sentence under the Texas scheme, the jury must an-
swer affirmatively each of three questions concerning the deliberate-
ness of the defendant's conduct, the future danger of the defendant
to society, and the possibility that the defendant's conduct was a re-
76 Harris, 104 S. Ct. at 879 (requiring procedure of proportionality review for every
death sentence would "substantially depart from the sense of Gregg and Proffitt").
77 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion).
78 Goodpaster, Judicial Review of Death Sentences, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 786,
793 (1983). The author suggested reading theJurek Court's language on evenhanded
sentencing to presume that Texas would conduct proportionality review. But see Dix,
Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEO. L.J. 97, 142 (1979) (Texas appel-
late courts limit their review of death sentence cases to whether substantial evidence
supports the jury's findings of fact in answering the special questions put to it by the
state). See infra note 81 for the list of special questions in Texas death penalty scheme.
79 104 S. Ct. at 879 (requiring procedure of proportionality review for every death
sentence "would effectively overruleJurek").
80 The Texas Code provides that a jury can impose a death sentence on a person
guilty of murder when:
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sponse to provocation. 81 The Texas statute also provides for auto-
matic review of the sentence by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
82
The Court in Jurek may have assumed that proportionality review
was unnecessary under the Texas scheme because Texas juries can
impose death sentences on narrower grounds than can juries in
Georgia and Florida. 83 Thus, the majority in Pulley v. Harris should
have demonstrated that California's scheme was similar to that of
Texas before deciding that the California Supreme Court need not
conduct proportionality review of death sentences.
In addition to interpreting its prior case law differently, the
Court in Pulley v. Harris could have reached a different result by ana-
lyzing empirical evidence that suggested that arbitrary sentencing
can occur under a state statutory scheme that lacks proportionality
review. The Court could have used a rationale similar to that used
in Godfrey v. Georgia,84 in which the Court ruled that a statutory ag-
gravating circumstance listed in Georgia's capital sentencing statute
was unconstitutionally vague, even though the Court had approved
the same provision in Gregg.8 5 The Court in Godfrey reasoned that
the statutory provision had become unconstitutional because the
manner in which the Georgia courts applied the provision marked a
(1) the person murders a peace officer or fireman who is acting in the lawful
discharge of an official duty and who the person knows is a peace officer or fireman;
(2) the person intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or
attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated rape, or arson;
(3) the person commits the murder for remuneration or employs another to
commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration;
(4) the person commits the murder while escaping or attempting to escape
from a penal institution; or
(5) the person, while incarcerated in a penal institution, murders another who
is employed in the operation of the penal institution.
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a) (Vernon 1974).
81 The Texas statute specifies that to obtain the death penalty against a defendant,
the state must prove to the jury each of the following issues beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that death of the
deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1974).
82 Id. at art. 37.071(f).
83 Goodpaster, supra note 78, at 793.
84 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
85 Id. at 427-33. The Court found that the provision of the Georgia code that al-
lowed the sentencing authority to sentence a person to death for a homicide that "was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity
of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim," did not sufficiently narrow jury discre-
tion. Id. at 429.
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return to arbitrary and standardless sentencing.8 6 Similarly, the
Court in Pulley v. Harris could have avoidedJurek by noting that the
manner in which courts without proportionality review procedures
currently impose death sentences marks a return to unevenhanded
sentencing.
Brooks v. Estelle87 exemplifies the current disproportionality of
the Texas scheme. In Brooks, the jury sentenced Charles Brooks to
death for committing a homicide, although the jury did not deter-
mine whether Brooks or his co-felon fired the fatal shot.8 8 Four
years after the jury imposed the death sentence, Brooks' co-felon
plea-bargained to a sentence of forty years in prison by pleading
guilty to a noncapital murder charge. 89 The Court in Pulley v. Harris
could have used this case to hold that sentencing practices under
the Texas capital sentencing scheme afterJurek demonstrated that
proportionality review was necessary to avoid the type of unfair sen-
tencing that occurred in Brooks.90
In addition to analyzing the disproportionate effects of the cur-
rent Texas scheme as exemplified by Brooks, the Court could have
surveyed capital sentencing statutes across the country to support a
different holding. Most states that specify the nature of appellate
review require that the reviewing court consider whether a sentence
is disproportionate to sentences in similar cases. 9 1 California, along
86 Id. at 431-33.
87 697 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1490 (1983).
88 Id. at 588. See Goodpaster, supra note 78, at 786.
89 697 F.2d at 588. The co-defendant, Woody Lourdes, plea-bargained with the state
after an appeals court reversed his conviction for the offense. Id.
90 The history of the Brooks case would have presented a peculiar problem to the
Court had it used Brooks to demonstrate disproportionality. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit had dismissed Brooks' claim that his sentence should be reduced be-
cause it was disproportionate to that of his co-felon. Brooks, 697 F.2d at 588. After the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case, the State of Texas executed Brooks on
December 7, 1982. N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1982, at 1, col. 6. Any decision that suggests
that Brooks' sentence was disproportionate would acknowledge the possibility that the
Supreme Court denied the appeal of a man who was wrongly executed.
91 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46b(b) (West
Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4 209(g)(2) (1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35(e)
(1982); IDAHO CODE § 19-2827(c) (1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.075(3) (Supp.
1982); LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 905.9 (West Supp. 1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 414(e) (1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 71 (West Supp. 1982); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 99-19-105(3) (Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.014(3) (Vernon 1979); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-310 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2521.01(5) to -.03 (1979); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 177.055(2) (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.5 (VII(c)) (Supp. 1981);
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3(e) (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4(c) (Supp.
1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.05(A)
(Baldwin 1982); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.13(c) (West 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42,
§ 9711(h)(3) (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-27A-12 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-205(c) (1982);
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with Texas, is one of the few states whose statute, although provid-
ing for special appellate review of death sentences, does not specify
the form of the review. Of thirty-seven states that impose capital
punishment, twenty-seven had proportionality review procedures as
part of their statutory schemes at the time of Pulley v. Harris.92 Addi-
tionally, several other states required proportionality review byjudi-
cial decision. 93 This indicates that a clear majority of state
legislatures and courts consider proportionality review by a state ap-
pellate court to be an important safeguard in preventing unfair sen-
tencing.9 4 The majority opinion in Pulley v. Harris, however, took no
notice of the extent to which states already require proportionality
reviews as part of their appellate review procedures.
In addition to considering the prevalence of proportionality re-
view in state capital sentencing schemes, the Supreme Court could
have arrived at a different result based upon principles of propor-
tionate sentencing established in Solem v. Helm.95 In Solem, the Court
overturned a life sentence for passing bad checks that was imposed
under the South Dakota recidivist statute because the sentence was
disproportionate to the crime.96 In deciding Solem, the Court enun-
ciated standards to guide courts in reviewing sentences for dispro-
portionality under the eighth amendment. Although courts
ostensibly were to apply these standards to determine whether a
sentence was proportionate to a crime,9 7 courts may also use these
standards as a measure of whether sentences for similar crimes are
proportionate. These standards include the gravity of the offense
and the harshness of the penalty, the sentences imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction, and sentences imposed for the
VA. CODE § 17-110.1(c) (1982); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.95.130(2) (Supp. 1983);
Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-103(d) (1983).
92 See supra note 91 and statutes cited therein.
93 State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 196, 560 P.2d 41, 51 (1976); Collins v. State,
261 Ark. 195, 221-22, 548 S.W.2d 106, 120-21 (1977); State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10
(Fla. 1973); People v. Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d 145, 161-71, 411 N.E.2d 849, 856-61 (1980).
94 The California Supreme Court, although it held that the Constitution does not
require a proportionality review procedure, indicated a willingness to conduct such re-
view if the United States Supreme Court required it to do so. People v. Frierson, 25 Cal.
3d 142, 182-85, 599 P.2d 587, 610-12, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 303-06 (1979). In Frierson,
the California Supreme Court stressed the importance of proportionate sentencing, but
questioned the necessity of the proportionality review procedure to achieve this goal.
Id.
95 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
96 Id. at 3016.
97 The Court had decided the issue of whether the penalty of death was proportion-
ate to the crime of murder in Gregg and concluded that death was proportionate. Gregg,
428 U.S. at 187.
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same crime in otherjurisdictions. 98 The second standard, requiring
review of sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdic-
tion, is of particular relevance to the issue in Pulley v. Harris.99
The Court in Solem stated that a comparison of sentences im-
posed in different criminal cases would be helpful in determining
whether sentences were cruel or unusual under the eighth amend-
ment.100 It stated that a sentence would be excessive if "more seri-
ous crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious
penalties."''1 1 Statutory distinctions on aggravating and mitigating
circumstances make some homicides punishable by death more seri-
ous than others. An appellate court would be able to measure ex-
cessiveness among death sentences by conducting a proportionality
review of the type requested by the respondent in Pulley v. Harris.
Despite the fact that the proportionality principles of Solem,
prior case statements on proportionality review, current state prac-
tice, and empirical evidence of disproportionality could have sup-
ported a different result in Pulley v. Harris, policy considerations
validate the holding that proportionality review is not a constitu-
tional requirement of a state capital sentencing scheme. Although
the majority opinion in Pulley v. Harris barely alluded to any of these
policy considerations, the considerations do support the Court's
holding. First, the Court indicated that it considered a proportion-
ality review procedure as a superfluous safeguard against indiscrimi-
nate sentencing.102 Second, the Court acknowledged that no
sentencing scheme could achieve perfectly uniform sentencing.'
03
Third, the Court avoided the problem of having to define the
proper scope of proportionality review. In defining this scope, the
98 Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3010.
99 The standard requiring review of the gravity of the offense and the harshness of
the penalty is not relevant to a death sentence proportionality inquiry because the Court
has already determined that the gravity of the offense of murder justifies the penalty of
death. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187. The standard of reviewing a sentence in terms of
sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions is particularly difficult to
apply in a death sentence inquiry because many jurisdictions do not impose the death
penalty.
100 Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3010.
101 Id.
102 Harris, 104 S. Ct. at 881.
103 Id. Some scholars have echoed the Court's doubts about the effectiveness of pro-
portionality review in achieving uniform sentencing within a system that emphasizes in-
dividual differences among defendants. See, e.g., Dix, supra note 78, at 161. Dix notes
that appellate review procedures have failed to meet expectations that such schemes
would achieve uniform sentencing. The author attributes this to the practical impossi-
bility of achieving uniform sentencing within a system of individualized sentencing
where the sentencing authority takes all the circumstances of the individual defendant
and the crime into account before imposing a punishment. Id. at 160-61.
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Court would have had to either intrude into the legislative arena by
mandating a far-reaching proportionality review procedure or man-
date a procedure that it considered superfluous and ineffective. Fi-
nally, the Court may have feared imposing a burden on state and
federal courts by opening a new avenue for extensive appeals on
proportionality grounds by death row inmates.
V. CONCLUSION
In Pulley v. Harris, the Court held that the Constitution does not
require a capital sentencing scheme to have a provision for propor-
tionality review of each sentence. The Court based its decision on
the lack of importance it previously had attached to the procedure
when it approved sentencing schemes that provided for proportion-
ality review, as well as the absence of the procedure in other ap-
proved schemes. Thus, the Court ruled that the procedures of the
California system eliminated arbitrariness without a review for pro-
portionality. The Court could have come out differently, however,
based on an analysis of its earlier death penalty decisions in which it
lauded proportionality review, a review of empirical evidence that
suggests that disproportionate sentencing may occur under a
scheme without proportionality review, a consideration of current
state practice of proportionality review, and an application of its
proportionality principles announced in Solem v. Helm.
The Pulley v. Harris decision probably will minimize state appel-
late court concern with conducting thorough proportionality review
procedures. A possible implication of Pulley v. Harris is that state
appellate courts may conduct fewer cross-case comparisons, review-
ing death sentences to determine only whether substantial evidence
supports the sentence. Furthermore, states without a proportional-
ity review procedure will be unlikely to adopt one unless the
Supreme Court decides that a state capital sentencing scheme does
not adequately check arbitrariness without proportionality review.
Despite the Court's failure to require proportionality review,
Pulley v. Harris does help to establish appellate review as a necessary
part of a constitutional capital sentencing scheme. The majority
emphasized that automatic appellate review is one of the elements
of California's sentencing scheme that made it constitutional. But-
tressed by Justice Steven's concurrence, Pulley v. Harris thus estab-
lishes that a constitutional sentencing scheme requires some form of
appellate review of death sentences.
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